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Worldviews, Moral Seemings, and Moral Epistemology 
 
 
 I shall try to address a rather big topic in this paper by looking at some of the connections 
between moral epistemology and what I shall call worldviews, as well as the role moral 
intuitions of a type I shall call “seemings” play in mediating between the two.  I want to examine 
both the impact of worldviews on moral epistemology as well as some of the ways in which what 
we say about moral knowledge might impact our worldviews.  I shall argue that worldviews 
often play a significant role, even if they are present only in the background, in moral 
epistemology.  I shall also argue that our moral convictions sometimes can reasonably shape 
metaethical claims, and thereby indirectly have an impact on worldviews.  The commerce 
between worldviews and metaethical and normative ethical convictions thus runs in both 
directions. 
 I begin with a striking observation about disagreements in moral philosophy from Gilbert 
Harman: 
It turns out, to my surprise, that the question whether there is a single true 
morality is an unresolved issue in moral philosophy.  On one side are relativists, 
sceptics, nihilists, and noncognitivists. On the other side are those who believe in 
absolute values and a moral law that applies to everyone.  Strangely, only a few 
people seem to be undecided.  Almost everyone seems to be firmly on one side or 
the other, and almost everyone seems to think his or her side is obviously right, 
the other side representing a kind of ridiculous folly.  This is strange, since 
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everyone knows, or ought to know, that many intelligent people are on each side 
of this issue.1 
I think something like what Harman says is true, although I do not think his characterization of 
the people who are not “relativists, sceptics, nihilists, or noncognitivists” is quite right.  It seems 
to me that one might well defend a “robust moral realism” to use David Enoch’s phrase, without 
necessarily defending anything that could usefully be described as “absolute values.”  I shall in 
this paper refer to all those people on the other side of Harman’s divide as moral realists, taking 
the term to refer to those who believe there is such a thing as objective moral knowledge, where 
objective moral knowledge is understood as knowledge of moral propositions whose truth is 
“stance-independent” (to use Russ Shafer-Landau’s useful characterization) of human beliefs, 
actions, attitudes, and emotions.  I shall refer to the people who are on Harman’s side (relativists, 
skeptics, nihilists, or noncognitivists) as moral skeptics, using the term here not in its usual sense 
but more broadly to describe anyone who denies that we have objective moral knowledge. 
 Suppose we grant, at least for the sake of discussion, that there is a divide among moral 
philosophers (and perhaps among non-philosophers also) that is somewhere in the neighborhood 
of the one Harman describes.  Let us grant further, again at least for the sake of discussion, that 
Harman is right in claiming that people on each side of this divide tend to be quite confident that 
their view is correct and that the other side is seriously wrong.  If this is so, how might we 
explain this phenomenon? 
 Harman himself suggests that the reason for the divide is that there are two radically 
different approaches to doing moral philosophy.  His own explanation of the difference sees it as 
centering on “a difference in attitude toward science.”  Here is the alleged difference: “One side 
 
1 Gilbert Harman, “Is There a Single True Morality?” in Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 78.  
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says we must concentrate on finding the place of value and obligation in the world of facts as 
revealed by science.  The other side says we must ignore that problem and concentrate on ethics 
proper.”2  Once again, I think Harman is picking out a real difference, but I do not think his 
description of the difference is perspicuous.  If one looks at an expressivist such as Simon 
Blackburn and a moral realist such as David Enoch, I doubt very much that there is a significant 
difference between them in their attitudes towards science.  Enoch, for example, seems just as 
firmly committed to evolutionary theory as Blackburn. 
 The difference between them may involve science, but it is not a difference in their views 
of science or their views of the value of science.  Rather, Harman seems to have a kind of 
philosophical conviction (we might call it philosophical faith) that the truths of science are all the 
factual truths there are, while Enoch seems open to the possibility that there are some truths that 
are not discoverable by science.  I call Harman’s view philosophical and not scientific, because I 
take it that it is obvious that the claim that all truths about reality are scientific truths is not itself 
a theory or conclusion of any science.  It is rather a claim about science.  I shall call Harman’s 
view about science the completeness of science thesis.   
The difference in views about the completeness of scientific thesis is rooted in a deeper 
difference.  I would describe that difference as a difference in worldviews.  One can see this if 
one notes that among the people who would deny Harman’s claim about the completeness of 
scientific knowledge one would find Platonists, Idealists, Theists, Panentheists, and perhaps 
Pantheists.  All of these people have recognizable worldviews that at least fit poorly with the 
completeness of science thesis. 
 
2 Harman, 79. 
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 What about Harman’s own view?  I would describe it as a worldview as well, one that is 
usually described as some form of metaphysical naturalism, understood roughly as the view that 
that there is nothing real over and above the natural world.  (I want to distinguish metaphysical 
naturalism from naturalism as a metaethical view, since there might well be some who are 
advocates of metaethical naturalism who reject metaphysical naturalism.)  Some may want to 
deny that metaphysical naturalism is a worldview, claiming that it is simply a common-sense 
view of things.  However, the claim that metaphysical naturalism is not a worldview is surely 
mistaken.  When a worldview is widely shared, as metaphysical naturalism is among 
contemporary intellectuals, and its truth more or less taken for granted by many, its character as a 
worldview may be easy to forget.  However, if views such as Platonism, Idealism, Theism, and 
Pantheism are worldviews, and metaphysical naturalism is a logical alternative to those views, 
then metaphysical naturalism must be a worldview as well.  So, if Harman is right in claiming 
there is a particular divide in approaches to moral philosophy, and I am right in how I 
characterize that divide, there are clearly ways in which worldviews impact moral philosophy, 
and perhaps ways that moral philosophy may impact worldviews as well.  I shall return to the 
importance of this in my conclusion. 
Methodists and Particularists in Epistemology 
 I now wish to connect the divide Harman notes within moral philosophy to another divide 
that is present in epistemology more generally, as well as in moral epistemology, the divide 
Roderick Chisholm describes as the disagreement between “methodists” and “particularists.”3  
The term “particularist” here is not used as it normally is in moral philosophy.   On Chisholm’s 
view, methodists and particularists are committed to two rival ways to resolve what has been 
 
3 See Roderick M. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 
particularly pp. 61-70, for an account of this distinction. 
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called, since the days of the ancient Greek skeptics, “the problem of the criterion.”  The problem 
is easy to state.  All of us presumably have some beliefs that are true and some that are false.  We 
also know some things, or at least think we do, but it seems highly likely that some of the things 
we think we know we do not actually know.  How can we distinguish the false beliefs from the 
true ones, and the genuine cases of knowledge from the spurious ones?  The people Chisholm 
calls “methodists” think that to do this sorting, one needs a “criterion,” some tool that will 
provide a reliable method for dividing the epistemic sheep from the goats.  Once we have our 
method in place, we can then decide what particular beliefs are true, and which beliefs count as 
genuine knowledge.  John Locke would perhaps be a paradigm of methodism. 
 Particularists deny that we must have a method or criterion to enable us to do this.  On 
the contrary, particularists say, if we are to gain any useful knowledge about what methods for 
obtaining knowledge or true beliefs are reliable, we must already know some things.  
Particularists say, for example, that if I believe that human memory, sense perception, and 
mathematical reasoning are all reliable ways of arriving at true beliefs or knowledge, that is 
because we have learned that they mostly give us true beliefs.  However, that surely presupposes 
that we can recognize genuine particular cases of knowledge and true beliefs independently of 
knowing what methods are reliable.  To develop good theories about how knowledge or true 
beliefs are obtained, we must already have some knowledge and true beliefs.  Thomas Reid and 
G. E. Moore could serve as paradigms of particularism. 
 My own hunch is that a proclivity towards methodism or particularism is closely linked 
to how seriously a philosopher takes the problem of skepticism, whether the skepticism be global 
or regional in nature.  If one thinks that skepticism is a real problem, and that the skeptic needs to 
be answered, one will naturally seek a criterion or method that will give us a way to certify 
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claims to knowledge or true belief.  On the other hand, if one thinks that skepticism is an 
impossible stance, one that does not have to be taken seriously, one will likely think that the best 
way to make progress in epistemology is to begin with the assumption that we have particular 
cases of knowledge or at least justified true beliefs which can serve as a basis for doing 
epistemology.  My own sense is that since Chisholm wrote, the tide in epistemology generally 
has moved in the direction of particularism.  Skepticism is unpopular, and most epistemologists 
assume that we can rely on intuitions and make judgments about cases of knowledge.  If that is 
so in epistemology generally, it perhaps provides some support for particularism in moral 
epistemology as well. 
Particularism (or Priorism) in Moral Epistemology and Intuitive Moral Judgments 
 If we turn from general epistemology to moral epistemology, something like the 
difference between methodism and particularism reappears, although the terminology in this case 
is, as I noted, confusing, since “particularism” in moral philosophy is often used to describe the 
normative claim that there are no general, indefeasible, moral truths.  I shall therefore from this 
point on refer to what Chisholm called “particularism” as “priorism” to avoid confusion.  
Perhaps methodism is more plausible than priorism in moral epistemology (at least to many 
philosophers) than it is in epistemology generally, simply because skepticism in moral 
epistemology seems more plausible to many than global skepticism. Furthermore, I think that the 
divide between methodists and priorists in moral epistemology aligns pretty closely with the one 
Harman noticed.  Moral skeptics in my sense (those who deny we have objective moral 
knowledge) will naturally think that those who believe there is objective moral knowledge incur 
a burden of proof.  It appears to them that moral realists need to give an account of how we have 
this alleged knowledge.  Moral skeptics are drawn to methodism, and they think that weaknesses 
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in moral epistemology cast doubt about, or perhaps add further justification for doubt about, 
whether there is any genuine moral knowledge at all. 
 On the other hand, those who are confident that we have objective moral knowledge 
seem more likely to be priorists.  They may be just as interested in moral epistemology as the 
skeptics are but for different reasons.  They may want to understand how we gain moral 
knowledge, but they do not think that this understanding is necessary to provide any kind of 
basis or foundation for moral knowledge.  Rather, their attitude is more like the dominant 
attitude found today among philosophers of science.  Most philosophers of science today do not 
see themselves as offering a kind of certification of the soundness of science, as if science stood 
in need of philosophical foundations, even though such an attitude was common among 
philosophers in the past, as can be seen in thinkers from Kant to Husserl.  Rather, they assume 
that science gives us genuine knowledge, but want to understand how science works.  They think 
this understanding is likely to be gained from paying attention to actual scientific inquiry, both 
today and in the past.   
Similarly, defenders of moral knowledge may certainly want to understand how we get 
moral knowledge, but they do not necessarily see moral agents as dependent on philosophy to 
provide a kind of foundation for morality, a foundation that would be something like a 
certification of the genuineness of moral knowledge.  Rather, the presumption is that if there are 
no actual examples of moral knowledge that can be recognized, moral epistemology would be a 
hopeless undertaking. 
 If we assume that some (perhaps most) human persons have some genuine moral 
knowledge, then it seems evident that humans must have cognitive capacities of some kind that 
make that knowledge possible.  The task of moral epistemology will consist in part in describing 
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those capacities and understanding how they work, a task that is likely to be at least partly 
dependent on empirical psychology.  It seems plausible that at least some of the moral 
knowledge we have on such a view will be basic in the sense of being non-inferential, which is 
why forms of moral intuitionism have had enduring appeal for those who favor priorism in moral 
epistemology. 
 If we claim that all moral knowledge is inferential in character, based on propositional 
evidence, then familiar problems will arise about the premises for the arguments for moral 
conclusions.  If we require arguments for those premises, and so on for the premises of those 
arguments, and there is no non-inferential knowledge, then it looks like the only options are an 
infinite regress, or (more plausibly) some form of coherentism.  However, in my view, even a 
plausible form of coherentism will have to make some use of moral intuitions.   
It seems possible to construct a moral system that would be a kind of anti-morality, 
affirming the reverse of all our normal moral judgements, or at least affirming moral judgments 
that would differ dramatically from ordinary morality.  Imagine for example someone who is 
demonic in character, and like Milton’s Satan, affirms “Evil be thou my good.”  Such a person 
might believe we have moral obligations to lie, cheat, and generally mistreat others as much as 
possible.  If that seems impossible, we can at least coherently imagine someone, perhaps after a 
quick reading of Nietzsche, affirming a kind of morality that is “beyond good and evil,” in which 
the strong and creative individuals do not have obligations towards the weak or the sick.  Such a 
system might be perfectly coherent internally, perhaps as coherent as contemporary common-
sense morality, but enormously less plausible to most people than common-sense morality.  If so, 
the greater plausibility of the common-sense moral “web of beliefs” would surely be due to the 
greater plausibility of many of the individual judgments that make up that web.  Even if there is 
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no body of moral truths that is foundational, the superiority of a moral web of beliefs over an 
anti-moral web of beliefs seems to be grounded at least partly in the plausibility of the particular 
components of the moral web.  It is hard to imagine a case for ordinary morality that does not 
lean in some ways on intuitions. 
Robert Audi’s Moral Intuitionism 
Robert Audi, in The Good in the Right, has argued forcefully that many of the objections 
that are often raised against forms of moral intuitionism of the type defended by David Ross can 
be met.  Rossian intuitionism is often alleged to be very implausible because it posits a special 
cognitive moral faculty, or because it alleges that fundamental moral principles cannot be argued 
for, or that they are indefeasible, or that they are “self-evident” in the sense that their truth is 
immediately obvious to anyone who understands them.  In some cases, Audi shows that Ross 
himself does not make such claims for moral intuitions.  For example, Ross does not claim that 
moral intuitions require a special cognitive faculty or that they can never be doubted by anyone 
who understands them.  In other cases, Audi argues that claims Ross may have made can be 
dropped from moral intuitionism, preserving what is important in the view while making it far 
more plausible.   
Audi argues for viewing moral intuitions as “prima facie justified inputs to ethical 
theorizing,” and shows that those committed to moral intuitions in this sense can employ what is 
usually termed “reflective equilibrium” to extend and systematize those inputs.4  Although Audi 
himself favors what he calls a “moderate rationalism” in moral epistemology, he claims that 
moral intuitionism is also a live option for those who favor a more empiricist account of moral 
knowledge.5  In his 2015 article, “Intuition and Its Place in Ethics,” Audi goes even further by 
 
4 Audi, The Good in the Right, p. 78. 
5 Audi, The Good in the Right, pp. 55-57. 
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arguing that there can be rational disagreements about moral intuitions that are self-evident:  
“The self-evident need not be unprovable, need not be obvious, and need not be rationally 
beyond dispute.”6 
In the article just referred to, Audi carefully distinguishes between six different forms of 
intuitions.  For example, he distinguishes perception-like “objectual intuitions” from intuitive 
judgments that are propositional in nature, but for my purposes I will ignore most of these 
distinctions.  Since the phrase “moral intuitions” is so often used to refer to moral principles that 
can be known in a strong way, to avoid confusion I shall, in the remainder of this paper, mostly 
reserve talk of moral intuitions to those kinds of cases.  However, as Audi notes, there are also 
perceptions about particular cases (and judgments based on such perceptions) that have a kind of 
immediate, non-inferential appeal.  I shall in this paper call these cases of “moral seemings.”  For 
my purposes moral seemings can be actual perceptions of particular actions or states of affairs as 
having moral properties, as well as non-inferential moral judgments about such particulars that 
seem correct.  (Of course the seemings about propositional judgments could be grounded in 
actual perceptions.)  I realize that the term “seemings” could be applied to Rossian principles as 
well, and what I am calling seemings could also be called intuitions and indeed are sometimes 
described in this way.  However, I think intuitive judgments about particular actions and 
situations are different enough from intuitions about principles that a different name for them 
would be useful.  The paradigm of a moral seeming will be something like this: It seems to me 
that the man that I see down my street who is beating his dog is doing something morally wrong. 
What status do moral seemings have?  In the spirit of Audi’s project of weakening 
intuitionism and thereby making it more plausible, I suggest the following:  Instead of saying, as 
 
6 Robert Audi, “Intuition and Its Place in Ethics,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association (I, 1; March 
2015), pp. 57-77.  (Quotation is from p. 66) 
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Audi does, that moral intuitions about particular cases, which I am calling seemings, give us 
“prima facie justified inputs to ethical theorizing,” let us suppose that moral seemings merely 
offer some degree of prima facie support to candidates to be inputs to ethical theorizing, where 
the “possible inputs” are moral judgments.  This allows for the plausible view that some moral 
seemings seem much stronger than others.  All of our moral seemings on the view I am 
describing are fallible, but all offer some degree of prima facie justification for moral judgments. 
However, in some cases the degree of justification may be low enough that the seeming by itself 
does not offer even prima facie justification for a moral judgment.   
This might be the case for a number of different reasons.  One is that the intuition itself 
might be very weak, one that I have a natural tendency to doubt.  The seeming might also 
conflict with other seemings that are present at the same time.  Another type of case might be 
one where I have learned that moral seemings of a particular type are unreliable, even if those 
intuitions seem strong.  As an example of this consider the case of a person raised in a racist 
society who has been socialized to see people of another race as untrustworthy and immoral, but 
who has come to realize the wrongness of those experiences and the judgments they give rise to.  
To such a person someone of another race might still appear to have bad moral qualities, but the 
person has learned to discount these seemings as the product of cultural bias and immediately 
knows they are not a reliable source of moral insight.  In other cases, the seemings might be 
powerful, almost impossible to doubt, and the person may have no reason to doubt them, even 
though they are in principle fallible. 
I want to claim that if someone is a moral priorist and believes that there is such a thing 
as genuine moral knowledge, this weak endorsement I have offered to moral seemings, when 
combined with other normal human cognitive capacities such as reflection, is strong enough to 
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provide an explanation of how moral knowledge is possible.  I am not claiming that our moral 
cognitive capacities are limited to moral seemings.  If we humans are capable of such things as 
grasping abstract moral principles that are necessarily true and self-evident through rational 
intuition, that would be a good thing, a huge bonus for the project of showing how moral 
knowledge is possible.  However, if we merely have more humble cases of experiences that 
provide moral seemings about particulars, perhaps by way of emotions, that might be enough to 
get the ball rolling.  Thoughtful humans could then reflect on these moral seemings, attempt to 
systematize them and theorize about them, testing those theories against experiences, which may 
be refined and shaped through the process of reflecting on them, seeking reflective equilibrium. 
 Why should we trust moral seemings if they are as fallible as I am prepared to admit?  It 
is important to form this question carefully.  We should not necessarily “trust” all our moral 
seemings in the sense of believing that they provide justification, even of a prima facie sort, for 
moral judgments.  Rather, we trust them only in the sense that the fact that some proposition or 
state of affairs or action seems to have a certain moral quality provides some degree of prima 
facie support for the corresponding judgment.  We might say that what a seeming provides is 
some reason to believe a particular moral judgment is true, even though the reasons provided 
may vary greatly in strength.  Obviously, once particular judgments of this sort are accepted, 
inductive generalizations could be accepted as well.  Reflection may also give us the ability to 
recognize common features present in various moral judgments, which may make it possible to 
recognize abstract principles underlying the judgments.  Conflicts between moral seemings will 
have to be resolved, and, just as is the case with other empirical judgments, a reasonable person 
will consider the seemings of other people, especially those regarded as having particular moral 
expertise. 
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This stance could be defended, I think, simply as a particular application of what some 
philosophers call “the principle of phenomenal conservatism,” which at least some internalist 
epistemologists argue is a necessary epistemological principle if one is to avoid global 
skepticism.  Here is Michael Huemer’s version of this principle: “If it seems to S as if P, then S 
thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that P.”7 The principle I am defending 
is even weaker than Huemer’s, since all I am supposing is that a moral seeming provides some 
degree of prima facie justification for a belief.  Thus, a moral seeming, though it always provides 
some support for a moral belief, does not always or automatically provide prima facie 
justification for a moral judgement or belief.  
In the remainder of this paper I shall try to do two things.  First, I want to look at the 
status of moral seemings in light of contemporary psychology, to see what light this might shed 
on their epistemic status.  Then, after a brief look at debunking arguments that purport to show 
that we should not trust our moral judgments, I shall return to the subject of worldviews and ask 
how particular worldviews might affect the credibility of moral seemings, as well as the 
credibility of moral knowledge in general. 
Scientific Accounts of Moral Seemings 
 Anyone who is aware of the incredible diversity of moral practices and beliefs found in 
human societies through the centuries may be tempted to the view that our moral seemings are 
purely culturally based.  This is not a new issue.  Herodotus, in his Histories, tells a story about 
the Persian king Darius, who first summoned some Greeks to his court, and then some natives 
from a tribe in Callatia in India, and asked them both about how they treated the dead bodies of 
 
7 Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory: Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 98.  Other philosophers, such as Richard Swinburne, defend a similar 
principle but call it “the principle of credulity.”  See Swinburne, The Existence of God, pp. 303-15. 
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their fathers.  Darius asked the Greeks what they would take to eat these bodies, and was told 
that they would not do it for any amount of money.  The Callatians, who in fact (according to the 
story at least) actually did eat their fathers’ bodies, were asked what they would take to burn 
them, and responded with horror that such a thing should not even be mentioned.8 
 Even if the story by Herodotus is true, it does not show that Greeks and Callatians 
necessarily disagreed completely.  Neither Greeks not Callatians were said to think that one 
should be indifferent towards the bodies of fathers.  The differences in behavior might have 
stemmed from differences in non-moral beliefs or differences in the conventional symbolic 
meanings of the different actions.  However, if moral seemings were completely a product of 
culture, and if there were no areas of agreement among humans about moral matters, then we 
would have little or no reason to believe that moral seemings provide evidence of moral truth.  
Fortunately, this is not the case.  We now have substantial scientific evidence that 
humans are hard-wired to see the world in moral ways.  Our basic moral impulses, while 
certainly shaped by culture to some degree, seem to be fundamentally similar over different 
cultures.  The evidence for this comes from studies of small children and infants as young as 
three months old, studies that have been replicated across many cultures.  Yale developmental 
psychologist Paul Bloom summarizes these findings as showing that “some aspects of morality 
come naturally to us.”  The natural endowments, according to Bloom, include the following: 
1.  A kind of moral sense: “some capacity to distinguish between kind and cruel actions,” 
along with a natural tendency to favor the former and dislike the latter. 
2.  Some natural empathy and compassion: “suffering at the pain of those around us and 
the wish to make this pain go away.” 
 
8 The story, whose historical authenticity is doubtful, can be found in Book 3, Chapter 38, of Herodutus’s Histories. 
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3.  A basic sense of fairness: “a tendency to favor equal divisions of resources.” 
4.  A basic sense of retributive justice, in the sense of “a desire to see good actions 
rewarded and bad actions punished.”9 
There is also empirical evidence that the moral seemings we are hard-wired to make are 
not infallible.  For example, it is not hard to find cases in which the natural emotion of disgust is 
morally unreliable, giving rise to prejudiced judgments most of us would reject.  Even without 
knowing this, it seems obvious that the fact that we are hard-wired to respond to the world in 
certain ways does not prove that our natural endowment enables us to track objective moral facts.  
It does not follow from the fact that we have a natural tendency to make a type of judgment that 
the judgment is true.  (I shall shortly discuss Sharon Street’s well-known argument that an 
evolutionary explanation of our basic moral impulses presents a problem for moral realists.)   
It is also important to note, as Nietzsche constantly emphasized, that we also have natural 
tendencies to engage in immoral behavior: acts of violence and cruelty towards others.  
However, despite the fact that these base urges seem to be equally as “natural” as our moral 
impulses, the two do not have the same status.  Sane human beings who are not psychopaths do 
not normally approve of bad behavior, especially when others are engaging in it at their expense.  
Furthermore, when people engage in such bad behavior themselves, they typically rationalize it, 
redescribing it as good in some way or at least providing some justification that would excuse 
themselves from being judged immoral. 
It looks as if even human infants experience moral seemings.  In studies virtually all six 
month old infants, when showed two geometrical figures, one of whom was a “helper,” and one 
 
9 This summary of findings can be found in Paul Bloom, Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil (New York: 
Broadway Books, 2013), p. 5.  Bloom’s book is a popular presentation, but it describes a large amount of 
experimental scientific research. 
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of whom was a “hinderer,” responded positively to the helper and negatively to the hinderer.10  
Bloom himself describes the work as “finding in babies what philosophers in the Scottish 
Enlightenment described as a moral sense.”  As Bloom notes, this is not an impulse to act in a 
particular way, but a cognitive faculty: “the capacity to make certain types of judgments—to 
distinguish between good and bad, kindness and cruelty.”11 
To be sure, the research findings show that the basic cognitive powers that come 
naturally to humans are far removed from the sophisticated moral systems of Mill or Kant.  
Young children of course do not naturally perceive all human beings as “ends in themselves,” 
and they have little inclination towards the universal beneficence enjoined by utilitarian ethics.  
Bloom notes some of the limitations of the moral sense the experiments found: “We are by 
nature indifferent, even hostile, to strangers; we are prone toward parochialism and bigotry.”12  
The morality that is embedded in our natural moral seemings seems to be one that is restricted in 
scope.  We recognize goodness and badness quickly and easily in our dealings with family, 
friends, and neighbors, but less easily, if at all, in relation to strangers and those who are 
different from us. 
Still, we do have a kind of rudimentary moral sense which enables even small children to 
make some moral judgments that are correct.  At least this is so if we assume that humans do 
have some genuine moral knowledge.  And it does not seem too hard to imagine how rational 
reflection on those moral responses that come naturally to us could lead someone to expand the 
scope of moral concern beyond family and friends.  A Socrates, or a Buddha, or a Confucius, not 
to mention a Moses or a Jesus, might think something like this:  
 
10 See Bloom, pp. 28-31 
11 Bloom, p. 31 
12 Bloom, p. 6 
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It seems that I and the human persons around me (my family and friends) have a 
kind of value.  I can see why it is wrong for me to treat them badly.  However, I 
can see that other human persons, not my family and friends, are also human 
persons. similar in all kinds of ways to my family and friends.  If I perceive those 
close to me as having value, then why shouldn’t I think that those others have 
value as well? 
Thus, even if we put aside the possibility of a divine revelation, Moses (or whoever wrote the 
Pentateuch) might have been thinking something like this when the ancient Israelites were 
enjoined to treat the foreigner and stranger with kindness and justice.  Perhaps initially only a 
few exemplary people thought along those lines.  However, I find it impressive that once those 
thoughts are formulated by these moral pioneers, they seem convincing to many more 
thoughtful, reflective people.   
Interestingly, recently Eric Wielenberg has offered a similar story to explain how people 
might rationally come to believe in human rights.  In his version, humans naturally come to 
believe that there is a kind of “moral boundary” around themselves, which implies that it is 
wrong to violate the boundary by treating them in particular ways.  On Wielenberg’s story, once 
a person has formed such a belief, and also noticed that other people are similar to oneself, then 
one can follow the “likeness principle” to attribute something like human rights to others.13 
Perhaps without the guidance of these exemplars, our natural tendency would be to think 
as Polemarchus does in Book I of the Republic:  Do good to your friends but harm your enemies.  
However, when I read Socrates’ admonition that I should never do evil to anyone, even if others 
have done me evil, or Jesus’s story about the good Samaritan, who showed compassion on a 
 
13 Eric Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 135-142. 
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member of a tribe that looked down on him, I may recognize that Jesus and Socrates are right 
and my natural impulses to put limits on the scope of my moral responsibilities are wrong. 
This suggests that to get a fully developed, plausible normative moral theory one needs 
more than hard-wired moral seemings.  One needs to exercise rational reflection, taking into 
account the views of those who seem most wise.  The process will require paying attention to the 
moral seemings of others, and well as the reflections of others, and this will certainly require 
rejecting or modifying some of our moral seemings.  Seemings are not enough.  However, it also 
seems plausible that without our hard-wired moral seemings, moral knowledge would not get off 
the ground.  Reflection needs something with which to work. 
Darwinian Debunking Arguments 
 One might still wonder whether our moral seemings have even the low degree of 
epistemic merit I am ascribing to them.  After all, Sharon Street and others have famously 
offered what are now called “Darwinian debunking arguments” against the view that moral 
judgments track some kind of objective truth.14  The intuition that lies behind such arguments is 
that it seems likely that evolution would not select for cognitive faculties aimed at moral truth, 
but at cognitive faculties aimed only at survival and reproduction of organisms.  It would be a 
highly implausible coincidence if objective moral truth coincided with what the evolutionary 
process selected for. 
 Street’s version of the argument admits that morality is partly a product of many factors, 
including rational reflection but also social, cultural, and historical factors.15  However, she 
claims that it is still very plausible to think that evolution played a key role in developing our 
 
14 Street, Sharon, “A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value,” Philosophical Studies (27,1; 2006) 109-166.   
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moral beliefs and practices by selecting for what she terms “basic evaluative tendencies.”  She 
describes these in the following way: “an unreflective, non-linguistic motivational tendency to 
experience something as ‘called for’ or ‘demanded’ in itself, or to experience one thing as 
‘calling for’ or ‘counting in favor of’ something else.”16  These “proto-evaluations,” as Street 
terms them, seem quite similar to what I have been calling moral seemings.  Street also argues, 
as I have, that these basic evaluative tendencies are in some ways a necessary part of the story if 
there is such a thing as genuine moral knowledge.  She admits the importance of rational 
reflection, but she claims that “rational reflection must always proceed from some evaluative 
standpoint.”17 Rational reflection cannot stand completely apart from “one’s starting fund of 
evaluative judgments.”  Thus, Street thinks that if the “fund of evaluative judgments with which 
human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with illegitimate influence,” then the 
“tools of rational reflection were equally contaminated.”18 
 The overall argument Street presents is a dilemma.  Either there is no tracking relation 
between the basic evaluative judgments evolution has given us and alleged objective moral truths 
or there is.  If there is no such relation, then we have little reason to trust those judgments.  If 
there is a “tracking relation,” the judgments would be trustworthy, but Street argues that the 
claim that there is such a tracking relation is scientifically implausible. 
 There are now a large number of replies to Street (and other similar arguments) present in 
the literature.  One type of response is to argue that there is a relation between our basic 
evaluative judgments and normative truths that is not accidental, even though evolution did not 
select for those judgments because they were normatively true.  Rather, there is some third 
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17 Street, p. 124. 
18 Street, p. 124 
20 
 
factor, selected for by evolution, which is positively correlated with true normative judgments.  
For example, David Enoch argues that there is a kind of “pre-established harmony” between our 
moral intuitions and what is good and bad. The harmony is explained by the fact that survival, 
one of the factors driving natural selection, is itself objectively valuable.19  Erik Wielenberg 
argues that the third factor is simply the presence of rational faculties themselves.20  On his view 
it is a necessary truth that beings with such faculties have moral rights, but he believes that the 
possession of such faculties also causes those who have such rights to believe they have them.  
Thus, it is not an accident that at least some of our moral beliefs are accurate. 
 There is a dispute about the acceptability of this type of response.  Some of the 
evolutionary debunkers have argued that these responses are question-begging.  The defenders of 
moral knowledge assume that some of our moral judgments are true and try to show that those 
judgments can be explained as products or by-products of something that evolution does select 
for, thus showing that it is no accident that our moral faculties are at least partially reliable.  The 
debunkers claim that this amounts to assuming what is in question because the defenders, in 
order to show that our moral cognitive faculties are reliable, must assume we have some moral 
knowledge, but this is really to assume that our moral cognitive faculties are reliable.  However, 
the debunking arguments call into question the reliability of those moral faculties and thus imply 
we are not entitled to believe that some of our correct moral judgments are positively correlated 
with something evolution selects for.   
 I am sympathetic with the type of strategies Enoch and Wielenberg offer, though I have 
worries about the specific “third factors” they appeal to.  The goodness of survival seems too 
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limited and thin to do the work required here, and I do not think the possession of our cognitive 
faculties is an adequate ground for the possession of human rights, since such a view would not 
explain why infants or those with dementia or brain injuries have such human rights.  However, 
in principle I think their type of response is legitimate, and some similar strategy may succeed.  
It seems to me that appealing to moral knowledge in responding to debunking objections would 
only be illegitimate if those debunking arguments had given conclusive reasons to think that our 
moral faculties were unreliable, and thus that our claims to moral knowledge had been defeated.   
Russ Shafer-Landau, in his “Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism, and Moral 
Knowledge,” has argued convincingly that all of the versions of the debunking arguments that 
have been offered at least have premises that can reasonably be doubted.21  If Shafer-Landau is 
right, then moral epistemologists who are not methodists but priorists, and who are convinced we 
have some well-justified moral beliefs, seem well within their epistemic rights in relying on 
some of those moral beliefs in constructing a reply to what is best construed as a challenge to 
those beliefs, not a defeater.  One way of thinking of the challenge is this:  Evolution gives us 
some reason to worry about whether our moral knowledge is reliable.  It seems perfectly 
legitimate to respond to such a worry by constructing a plausible evolutionary scenario as to how 
beings such as ourselves might have gained true moral beliefs. 
 Indeed, I think it might be perfect reasonable for someone to continue to believe we have 
moral knowledge even if that person does not know how to respond to these debunking 
arguments.  Imagine someone has given an evolutionary debunking argument against the 
reliability of our mathematical intuitions, and that the defender of mathematical knowledge does 
not know how to respond to the argument.  The defender might reasonably reply, “I am not sure 
 
21 Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 7, 1; 2012), pp. 1-37. 
22 
 
why we have the mathematical faculties we do, or how evolution led to our having those 
capacities.  However, I am very confident that we have mathematical knowledge, and thus there 
must be a story to tell here, even if I do not know what the story is.”  If someone thinks, as I do, 
that some of our moral knowledge is as certain as mathematical knowledge, then a similar 
response could surely be given for morality. 
Worldviews as Shapers of Background Factors 
 However, many philosophers would disagree with me about this.  Many think that moral 
knowledge is somehow problematic in a way that other kinds of knowledge are not.  Why is this 
the case?  To return to the issue posed at the beginning, I suspect that in many cases the answer 
has to do with the presence of background beliefs that are tied to broader worldviews, though 
perhaps in some cases this influence may not rise to the level of conscious reflection.  Here is 
one way to put the point:  evolutionary debunking arguments gain some of whatever force they 
appear to possess from those metaphysical background beliefs.  It is not evolution as a scientific 
theory that creates problems for belief that we have reliable moral faculties; it is the conjunction 
of evolutionary theory and metaphysical naturalism. 
 The influence of such worldview-type background beliefs is perfectly explicit and 
conscious in the work of J. L. Mackie.  One of Mackie’s primary motivations for embracing an 
error theory of objective morality lay in what he called “the argument from queerness.”  This 
queerness for Mackie had two related parts: one metaphysical and one epistemological.  The 
metaphysical oddness is that if there are objective values, “they would be entities or qualities or 
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”22  The 
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epistemological problem is, according to Mackie, that moral knowledge would require a “special 
faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing.”23 
 It is obvious, I think, that morality’s alleged metaphysical queerness is only present if one 
assumes metaphysical naturalism.  Metaphysically, for example, if God and angels exist, it 
would simply be false that moral values would be utterly different from anything else in the 
universe.  With respect to the epistemological queerness, I have argued, along with Audi and 
many others, that there is no need for any special “moral faculty” to have moral knowledge, at 
least no faculty other than the kind contemporary cognitive psychologists study.  All we need are 
the kinds of seemings that contemporary psychology affirms we are hard-wired to have.  Or, 
perhaps better, all we need is to accept that the outputs of these seemings can be truth-tracking.  
On some metaphysical worldviews this seems highly plausible, even if it does not on others. 
 I can imaginatively enter the world of a metaphysical naturalist and get a sense of both of 
the kinds of queerness Mackie discusses.  It does seem to be the case that in that world it would 
seem odd, or at the very least surprising, that the fundamental entities of the universe would 
include things as diverse as physical particles and objective values.  It also would seem odd that 
humans, as purely physical creatures that are the product of an evolutionary process that has no 
telos, should have the ability to recognize those objective values.  However, as soon as I return 
from Mackie’s world to the world I believe I actually inhabit, the oddness vanishes.  I believe 
that the universe is the creation of a personal God who is himself essentially good, and that God 
created humans (through an evolutionary process) so they could enjoy a relationship of 
friendship with God.  To enjoy friendship with God those humans must be morally good.  If that 
friendship is to involve some degree of reciprocity, then those humans must somehow play a role 
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in their own development, and thus their goodness must be something that is acquired.  If this is 
true, then it seems entirely to be expected and not in the least odd that humans have the capacity 
to recognize moral value and to attempt to actualize such value. 
 I am not here attempting to give a moral argument for theism. There are other non-
theistic worldviews which would also reduce or eliminate the oddness Mackie saw.  For 
example, one might defend, as Ronald Dworkin did in his last book, Religion Without God, a 
metaphysical view in which there are simply basic moral facts that hold whether there is a God 
or not.24 
 I realize that someone who is a convinced metaphysical naturalist may be completely 
unmoved by such considerations.  Certainly, if we knew for certain that the universe was what 
philosopher George Mavrodes called (in honor of Bertrand Russell) a “Russellian universe,” then 
Mackie’s intuitions would have force.25  However, it is legitimate to ask whether we do know 
that the universe is a Russellian universe.  If we do not know this for certain, it is possible that 
our recognition of moral truth is itself a strong clue that the universe is not Russellian and that 
we ought to be open to other metaphysical alternatives.  Might morality itself be something that 
should unsettle a view that often appears to be accepted uncritically as part of the intellectual 
spirit of the age? 
 Immanuel Kant might well be taken as a model for such critical questioning.  I realize 
that many contemporary Kantians do not read Kant as a moral realist, but as a constructivist.  
However, I think this reading of the historical Kant is dubious.  Kant thought that his critique of 
metaphysics, which famously limited reason to make room for faith, was essential for his defense 
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of morality to succeed.  He did not believe that moral commitments could float free from 
metaphysical truth, even if those metaphysical claims cannot be established by theoretical 
reason.  It is only if we recognize that mechanistic science describes reality as it appears to us 
and not as it really is, that we are entitled to have what Kant called “moral faith,” in which we 
believe in our own reality as free moral agents with intrinsic value.  Although Kant connected 
this kind of moral faith with religious faith, and although both are forms of faith, they are still 
distinct.  For Kant moral faith is a form of faith because it is not grounded in theoretical reason, 
but it is crucial for him that the contents of this faith are consistent with the findings of 
theoretical reason.  Moral faith requires us to see ourselves in a certain way, and to reject the 
temptation to think that morality itself is only what Kant called “a figment of the brain.” 
 Suppose we agree with Wielenberg that humans have a kind of intrinsic value or dignity 
that grounds human rights, even if we disagree with his view that this quality is grounded in our 
ability to reason, and even if we can give no coherent account of why we have such a quality.  Of 
course one can easily imagine that this view is false, and that human rights, as well as the 
intrinsic value presupposed by such rights, are, as Bentham famously said, “nonsense on stilts.”  
Why should we think Bentham is wrong?  One answer to Bentham might to be to claim that I am 
morally obligated to believe that humans have the kind of value or dignity presupposed by belief 
in human rights.  To fail to believe that my fellow humans have the quality of dignity is in some 
way to devalue them; it is an unwarranted loss of faith in them.  Such a stance would certainly be 
in the spirit of Kant in holding that our deepest view about ourselves and our universe should 
itself be shaped by morality. 
26 
 
 William James is well-known for saying that his first action as a being with free will was 
to believe in free will.26  In a similar spirit, perhaps a moral being should say that his or her first 
act as a moral being is to believe in morality, and to believe that we live in a moral universe. 
Moral faith is not a substitute for moral epistemology, but it may provide motivation for the 
belief that there is such a thing as moral knowledge.  Moral epistemology may be another form 
of faith seeking understanding. 
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